All I want for Christmas is a few good plans
An open letter to Santa Claus on European military industrial mobilization
Two years ago I wrote a letter to Santa for NATO, and very plainly asserted my defense budget desires:
What defense leaders should want this Christmas is a “lump of coal” in the budgets; in other words, no immediate re-stocking of the arsenals. In turn, the temporal budgetary savings should be used, instead, to support and sustain their own civilian populations through this winter.
For all of the same reasons and a few new ones, for the NATO minus US community, I continue to counsel restraint, but with one caveat: plans (planning).
To reassert the critical priorities for those remaining allied nations, the foremost concern is to maintain the capacity to arm and rebuild Ukraine until liberation, irrespective of American policy choices under Trump. While I continue to think he could be played on heroic and rewarded terms to support Ukraine, his commitment to the Atlantic Markets Alliance is weakened on the shoals of his trade antipathy. (Worth considering that it was trade deficits/capital account surpluses that often drove foreign real estate investment that competed with Trump’s business in New York during the 1980s and 1990s.) The inbound President’s 5% demand is foolhardy on every front, and impractical in budgeting before his term of office ends. Nor does it come with any future guarantees. Thus, for the first time in 83 years, the US connection to Europe is questionable, and the security commitment uncertain. Its defence - and the support of Ukraine’s self defence - is its own. (Language matters here - without the American influence, UK English rules rule.)
The second priority is to harden the defences of the Russian near-abroad frontier states. In all respects, Putin must and can be deterred by conventional means, and the combined NAT-Euro alliance has the heft to do so. And to manage that, the third priority is for the rest of the countries to “tidy” their own arsenals, assess what is on hand, make arrangements to restock the required minimum, and take an holistic survey of the armed forces and supporting industry and infrastructure.
In line with that last, what NATO in Europe should want from Santa Claus are Two Good Plans, one industrial the other strategic.
A proper industrial plan for the 21st Century should take account of manufacture capacity/capability and critical infrastructure. Within and across the alliance, the state of all manufacture should be assessed. “Industrial and Infrastructural Mobilization Plans” are a good starting point to identify the needs and systems, but in no way should they be considered for implementation. But they will shine a light to the entirety of the economy in war. It is not always perfectly understood how different capabilities will be brought to bear on the future battlefield, so the broader the understanding the better. The Interwar ICAF lectures were filled with pure industrial content, no strategic claims necessary. But the better the military understood what could be done, what would be important in the first war of the I.C.E. Age, the better they would be able to build the arsenal of WWII. Across the continent there are myriad sectors, players, strengths, systems, and weaknesses. Assembling the industrial-infrastructure map will enable the proper macro-level organization of defence and arsenal planning.
The strategic plan (and yes, I actually mean the process of planning, not the end product) is more complicated and requiring more comfort with ambiguity. First, it must resist the desire for instant rearmament according to current conceptualizations of needs. It might be assumed that what will dominate the next war is known, but that is never the case. Even as the ascendant systems are emerging in Ukraine, for example, the responses and evolutions are already occurring. Thus, what is happening today is not even current. Second, it must expand the discussion of maritime and sea powers. Both the rise of oceanic infrastructure - literal SLOCs - and the uncertain American strategic future necessitate enhancing the naval capabilities. Third, it should encompass the industrial review and geo-economics in tandem. This is an opportunity across the continent to advance industries, strengthen infrastructure, and improve economic prospects at both ends of the prosperity spectrum - building the weaker economies and reinvigorating the advanced ones. In terms of physical and political security, this will be beneficial. Fourth, it must include support to civilian life (homeland and in theatre) within the defence priorities. As Ukraine is proving out, wars are contended in the civilian and martial theatres. Holding against the Russian invasion has been bought by dint of support and rebuilding as force of arms. Fifth, and finally, the biggest opportunity here is for equipment flexibility. By state, arsenals become limited by capital capacity. Agglomerated, the NATO minus US alliance can craft an industrial footprint to deliver more nuanced capabilities to the battlefield.
At a policy level, the NATO allies must resist the foolishness of the Trump Administration’s budget increase demands. Notwithstanding the inherent waste that always accompanies rapid spending expansion (see, eg, the Gilding of the Reagan Pentagon), the opportunity costs are simply too high right now. The better money is spent on social programs to stem extremism, capital investment in infrastructure and industry, and Ukraine’s defence. Or, shove all of that under “Defence” and point to all of the non-military items in the US budget.
It remains the time to hold in physical expansion of either arms or personnel. Yes, it feels insecure. But in the long run it is the better path. Actual preparation now would tie the allies to capabilities and warfare that may not be relevant when the crisis comes and diverts resources from immediate needs.
If you really can’t wait, may I recommend…?
Thank you, Santa Claus!