Logistics and Politics: A Better Perspective of January 6th
We opened the century in the worst destruction upon American territory wrought by a foreign enemy since Pearl Harbor, upon our leading cities since the War of 1812. Again, two decades later, like many others I watched the most consequential political and security history unfold. 9/11 and January 6th, two moments of the American experience that poised diverging paths of our better and worse selves. With hubris and nihilism to spare, at both crossroads we have chosen poorly.
But unlike many who will offer an analysis of the events at the Capitol, my brief is with the logistics of defense and the politics of the threat. Too many spend too much time of the defense failures without considering the many reasons why, most importantly of which would lead them to recognize the gravity of the issue at the political level.
On January 10th, after watching all of the footage on the day and what was added on following days, I wrote a thread of my assessment. Already, the tactical solution crowd were clamoring about the numbers of police, the lack of troops, the failure to keep the mob from the building. Already the “t’was foretold” finger wagging crowd were pointing at the obvious signs of leading up to the event. Neither took their positions beyond their first assumptions of success. “More police would have stopped the crowd!” Perhaps. But what if it enraged the mob? “Planning would have made a difference!” Uh, POTUS would have done what, exactly when presented with a brief of his threat and risk to the Capitol? No, I needed to point out that tactical defense was both impossible and the better part of a good outcome, and that the problem was and would remain at the political level, immune to resolution at tactical or even strategic levels of activity. Until American conservatism speaks down the recourse to irregular violence, the threat will remain. As long as Trump remains at the helm of MAGA Republicanism, that turn is unlikely.
To open the thread, I laid out this essential conundrum between the threat and the preparations, the politics and the strategy, and the problems of dissatisfaction with the tactical response. I have seen nothing since to change my mind on any of this.
Assumptions about the robustness of the Capitol Police initial deployment and response to the violence on Wednesday need pushback, both in how we understand this particular event to prepare for the immediate future, AND for dealing with RWE in the longer term. Critiques of the choices Capitol Police made ignore the truth in this event as in war: the solutions were always going to be found in and constrained by the political level. Given Trump’s endorsement and the broader political sanction for this event, MAGA and its constituent and associated groups, as well as their activities over the summer, a more aggressive approach was as likely to provoke further violence as to control events. The terms of the electoral contest have been drawn too starkly for this group to have been easily deterred. (And certainly the social media chatter before, during, and after, plus the many snippets of audio from the events themselves suggest that at least a significant cadre had strategic ambitions should the opportunity arise.)
I want to elaborate on one point I did not hammer in this thread, which is the scale of the defense that would have been necessary to defend the Capitol on the day, because I don’t think people really thought through what it would have meant. The size of the legislative estate and the edifice of the structure means any perimeter defending against a mass assault would have to sit beyond the buildings themselves. A perimeter defended in personnel, they would have to be numerous of bodies, bullets, or tanks. If in barriers, they would have needed to be of such heft and height at such a circumference as to make a fortress of the grounds. Each of which would likely have been logistically impossible on their own under the best circumstances.
Moreover, the ethos of taking American lives to protect Federal properties is anathema to political survival and correct notions of the balance of force in a liberal democracy. Against the public will manifest as a mob - even if terribly misled by the political leadership - such structures (both in substance and meaning) must withstand themselves the assaults of the public.
We will never know the prospects of non-events, but none of the information that has emerged since that day has suggested anything other than a significant degree of latent fighting potential on the side of Trump’s movements that could have been brought to bear in Washington under the correct circumstances of extended or expanded violence.
What have their activities suggested was possible? We should absolutely expect to find that there were armed auxiliaries tucked away near and over the state borders, capable of swarming the Capitol. (I would put good money on mobile data revealing a menacing disposition of "reinforcements".) Remember the Summer of the Truck? Now imagine that as training. And consider its application in a combined arms doctrine for urban chaos ops. (I will remind you of the 1919 TransCon Convoy of trucks, led by Eisenhower, used to demonstrate a strategic capacity of the new platform.) Remember the Garden State Parkway shutdown? More training for vehicle disruption of the roadways. Give a thought to how sufficient blockages at key highway and chokepoints would have affected the ability of police and military to support DC in the event of larger disruption. Further afield, there are waterways that run in close proximity to the critical terrain, so I can't help thinking about those boat rallies and what that might portend. (Who has forgotten Mumbai?)
This stands as well. Although there have been Federal level prosecutions, just like during late Jim Crow, too many of the States are not abiding. Nor are national level Republicans.
Notwithstanding legitimate discussions regarding race and recent protests, whether the Capitol Police leadership were derelict in planning or worse, there is a long history of LE taking a lighter approach to white supremacist and nationalist extremists, because of risks of escalation in the moment, and broader political responses in the longer term - because we simply cannot ignore the privileged place white supremacist extremism has enjoyed in the post Civil War era from America's Southern and conservative political elites, national and local. The difference in their activities has always been determined by the degree to which the public sanctions overt political support of this sentiment. (Just look at the trajectory of the KKK that morphed into the modern militia movement, as they ebb and flow according to political cover.)
American conservatism in governing power are responsible. It is true today, it was true then.
And this brings us to the crux of where we are. Right Wing Extremism must be addressed at the political level. It can only be constrained in the US when politicians withdraw their support. The movement will not be defeated in battle. Especially not when it is augmented, as it is now, with an even broader base capable of providing mass manpower to their events and a political voice to their efforts. (This is where Trump has been especially dangerous, in fully mobilizing a large segment of the public to their cause.)
As for this concluding sentiment? Nothing that has emerged since January 10th four years ago has altered my analysis of how events turned out.
What does this mean about how I understand Wednesday? To a degree, it is probably better that the police response was only just sufficient to protect what was vital. The risk of escalation and what might have followed as a consequence of that is far, far worse than what we saw, both in terms of physical destruction and political consequences. I simply don't see a tactical plan, or ensuing support of forces, that offers mitigation against escalation. To avoid the crisis, the only option was to remove proceedings to an alternative location. Because what POTUS and the elite GOP emboldened was not going to be muzzled and controlled in that moment. And as Republicans still largely refuse to disavow the lies inflaming the movement and the actors and organizers driving conflict, the threat and risk from these actors will remain significant.
Furthermore, and an issue that has never been addressed, how can defense against a President intent on domestic violence be prepared? Assessing, for example, the Secret Service’s preparations for January 6th, they were found derelict in dismissing the obvious accumulation of threats of violence. Putting aside whether any are politically compromised towards Trump individually, the crisis presented them with an impossible situation. They protect the President, and little of the intelligence suggested violence towards the man. Moreover, he intended to attend the rally at the Capitol in person. Beyond that, building a broader threat picture of violence towards others would have led them to the instigator, the President. The Secret Service needed the political apparatus within the Administration to solve the problem by way of the 25th Amendment. That was the only appropriate solution to a President threatening the U.S. Congress with violence. Once the Administration Officials failed in that duty, the Secret Service “dismissing” the threats was not the problem. Because knowing what was coming should not have changed the tactical response.
On the other hand, and as with much specific-event driven prognostications, this was not entirely correct. In addition to the very early negative response by even Republican leaders, I would argue that COVID, the arrest and prosecution of participants from January 6th, and the relatively quick return of Trump to the campaign trail probably influenced against irrelevant spasms of identifiable violence. With their candidate on the march himself, insurgency in earnest was less necessary and more potentially harmful to his political prospects. Nevertheless, I stand by the broader principle that tactical solutionism doesn’t work.
This means that for the foreseeable future (3-6 months), absent a change in heart from the Republican Party, we should expect more and more violent, incidents. This has serious implications for the inauguration and whether it is really advisable to take a tactical solutionist approach.
No notes.
Over the long term, we need to fully reckon this is at the political level, not the tactical, because every advance by security forces will produce asymmetric responses so long as political support remains. As in war, so too in domestic conflicts:
Then as now, fin.