Logistics and Strategy in the Russo-Ukraine War: The Allies and Ukraine, with a side glance at Russia
Sinews of War
In the annals of war, the Russo-Ukraine War will come to define the modern application of logistics strategies. As a matter of Logpower, the war goes a long way to demonstrating the validity of the concept. Logistics can lead in war for strategic to political effect.
From the earliest days of the war, the role of logistics in strategy was clear. First, the initial mass enabled by Russian interior lines of communication to assemble the invading army meant there was very little chance to stop the invasion at the frontier. To build that force would have taken such time and resources, in full view of Moscow. Putin simply would have acted sooner or differently, but it is unlikely this capability would have been established in full view without response. In the face of this stark reality, Ukraine’s simultaneous assertion it would fight with the sacrifice of territory in the opening phase made clear its military strategy would be LOCs War (Lines of Communication), harrying Russian logistics, in the initial instance those lines sustaining the offensive. This Logistics Strategy was only one part. However possible, civilian life would be cared for, defended, protected, and restored, what I have named the Protect Life Strategy. Finally, the Allied response to support Ukraine in materiel was the third and most obvious of the indicators. But US led western support that did not assume the strategic command was exceptional practice. Moreover, not only did the Allies deliver Arsenal of Democracy strategic level support, the Allied also stepped in as the silent operational logistics function for the deliveries, providing Ukraine with packages fully assembled with ammunition, spare parts, maintenance parts, and so on, ready to use kit. Married to specifically trained personnel, Allies and Ukraine have made the best use of both. With these opening moves making the war’s themes clear, let us turn to the logistics strategies of liberation and their effects on Russia’s war effort.
Setting the strategic agenda as the nation under attack, Ukraine has pursued two logistics-based strategies. Its military strategy has focused on weakening Russian capacity to support the invasion, enabling offensive operations to liberate occupied territories. In the land war, given the strategic imbalances married to local Ukrainian terrain intelligence, the first phase implementation addressed itself to in-country LOCs, disrupting tactical supply, literally attacking the transport lines sustaining the invading army. As the war progressed, Ukraine has advanced the LOCs War to Deep Strike targets, taking out Russian oil and weapons’ depots. In tandem, the Ukrainian army has fought to retake occupied territories and hold terrain elsewhere in relatively successful terms. Certainly, Ukraine has been wildly competent in killing Russian soldiers and destroying their arms. Neither are limitless. To a lesser noticed degree, Ukraine has pursued LOCs War in the maritime domain as well. The advances and wins in the naval theatre are arguably even more striking, with the significant diminution of the Russian capacity to support the war in the Black Sea in military and merchant tonnage.
Many have decried the lack of early Deep Strike capabilities. Beyond the matter of what not to have delivered to make this possible, there are strategic implications to timing. The time progression of the conflict matters for this campaign in Russian territory. As the cost of the war has increased for Russia, these losses now are more costly and more difficult than they would have been earlier in the war. Each strike has more effect. This cycle is also important to understanding how and when attrition collapse occurs – the degradation in each cycle of loss unseen, the weakening continues until the enterprise can no longer be sustained. The strategic operation is very slow and then all at once.
The other side of the logistics strategy President Zelensky has led is the Life Strategy. Which is to say, a considerable portion of the total logistics load into Ukraine consists of non-martial goods, from fire trucks to generators, industrial precursors to rail repair materiel, as well as the comings and goings of the quotidian economy. This focus has three objectives: sustain political will, maintain critical infrastructure, nurture economy for the post-war. Together, the two sides of the strategy will enable the public to support the armed forces in their campaign to liberate the country from the Russian invasion. Keep these materiel streams in mind.
Pursuing a Strategy of Logistics, the Allies have *delivered*. Pun intended, especially for the critics and naysayers.
In an historic and strategically savvy move, the Allies have chosen to support not supplant the local war effort. This is important because, if one looks at the record, nobody achieves liberation from occupation better than locals (second best is with local support, a la ETO in WWII). Furthermore, in the current context, a solitary Ukrainian fight for its survival deprives Moscow of a point of political escalation. Let it rain cynicism on the value of this consideration, but Putin has been deprived of any domestic leverage of fear and has *not* expanded the war beyond Ukraine’s borders, even as the Russian despot has raged and escalated pointlessly within the country.
In detail, this strategy has unfolded masterfully, in part because the Allies exercise this capability ceaselessly. To start, early geo-strategic echelons and simple systems meant assistance reached Ukraine in short order. Flowing closest and most familiar items and easily assimilated systems first made for the fastest and easiest deployment of materiel to the war. These furthermore went forward in complete and tactically assembled packages, sparing the Ukrainian forces a significant burden in operational logistics. This cycle was repeated with increasingly complicated weapons systems, including advanced training and maintenance requirements, accelerating as the war progressed from M177s to F-16s. And at the same time, Life Strategy materiel and support to the economy also went forward.
Despite significant and relentless criticism of political weakness among the Allies in supplying Ukraine’s war, the real defining terms of the support have always resided within the logistics. Aside from the GOP revolt (and I suspect Biden managed more than we now know behind the scenes) and the 155 rounds (unexpectedly from views preceding the war, the dumb artillery was important and numbers in the stocks mattered, so deliveries slowed until the industrial capacity caught up), the timings have always been defined by the total through-put possible into Ukraine, personnel training timetable, and the speed at which reliable packages of goods could be assembled. This cycle has successfully and reliably delivered the requirements of the alliance’s most advanced weapons platforms to critical tactical effect, a staggering collection of materiel and expertise to deliver pret-a-porter to a state at war. And by the way – so too has the economic support delivered success, with Ukraine’s defense manufacture capacity growing.
The Allies are out-performing the French and the other European powers in their support of the Continentals against the British in the American War for Independence. Unlike the British, however, Russia is also fighting a broader economic war with the Allies. Slowly enhancing the scope and bite of sanctions on its oil industry, other exports, and imports, the effects are proving out in the fundamentals. The ruble is tumbling, the size of the defense budget is expanding, inflation is rising, infrastructure is crumbling. And, for the first time since WWII, Russian territory is occupied by an enemy army. Industrial output and personnel capacity is at such an insufficiency that North Korea, one of Putin’s few remaining allies, has sent munitions and soldiers to the war in Ukraine. While many have rattled at this “escalation”, in strategic logistical terms it is very bad news. Working in combinations, the strategies are having their effect on the battlefields, with the Ukrainian public, and on the home-front in Russia.
Information from Ukraine Ministry of Defense.
If we merely take a snapshot of the last few days, the evidence is wildly in favor of the nesting doll of multiple logistics strategies. The Ukrainian MoD statistics of Russian losses to date are staggering, with Putin’s folly nearing the million-casualty mark as the worst of the harbingers. Continuing its maritime dominance, and perhaps a first for the capability, Ukraine’s naval drones took down two Russian helicopters. Ukraine’s economy, especially its ability to contribute to the war effort, is advancing. Announcing further progress in the sector, today’s news announces “Ukraine's Ministry of Defence approves hundreds of drone models and more for army use in 2024.” (1) On the civilian front, the air defense capabilities and forces are over-performing. And where the defenses cannot succeed, Ukrainian emergency services remain steadfast. Has the Protect Life Strategy worked? From Foreign Affairs, we have a view to how the war is shaping the country. How Ukrainian identity has been subtly but importantly transformed over the three years of war. Strengthened and deepened in the face of this crisis, the public is prepared to see the fighting to liberation’s end. (2) For the Russian side, amid an increasing offensive against oil and military targets within their borders, today Ukraine has closed the last of the gas pipelines through their territory. This leaves, according to one war analyst, three remaining critical nodes for the entire Russian gas pipeline operation, an ominous detail as Deep Strike intensifies.
On the merits of this attrition, with support continuing at current levels, Ukraine should be able to achieve the collapse of Russia’s ability to maintain its operation in a reasonable time frame. (3) But Russia’s loss was foretold in the first days, when it could not take Kyiv and Ukraine chose to fight. They lost again as the advance was defeated along its supply lines. Again when the counter-attack began pushing the Russians back. With the incursion into the homeland. As Deep Strike advances. Instead, Putin has doubled down and further invested his treasure, people, and power into the venture. His forces, the public’s patience, or his rivals’ fear cannot much longer endure. With the embarrassment of the Syrian loss, Russia’s indomitability is erased – notwithstanding the critical strategic setbacks it presents. And this has all been the result of logistics properly understood and applied.
Logpower will have its day.
Notes:
1 OLEKSANDR SHUMILIN — Tuesday, 31 December 2024, 20:51
2 “How the War in Ukraine Has Changed Ukrainians: Russia’s Invasion Has Spurred Long-Term Social Transformations,” Anton Grushetskyi and Volodymyr Paniotto, December 30, 2024.
3 Twelve to eighteen months is my view of a reasonable time frame given the current capabilities and politics. There are a lot of wildcards incoming and unknown. It could go much longer if the Trump Administration does something incredibly stupid. It could accelerate in the coming weeks to an end of mud season conclusion.