My intention with this platform is to address several key themes that animate logistics and modern life, from defense, to private enterprise, to geopolitics. Events in Syria inspire the timing of the debut a key piece of the last theme that Life at the Junction will cover. Just as the world is askew along the Mediterranean, this maritime view of the world best encompasses the global condition of geopolitics. Although inclusive of great expanses of ocean, in the post-16th century system of global navigation the long miles are of less consequence than the critical chokepoints separating and defining regions and trade routes. Any global nation – even those we might consider traditionally continental – of the modern era recognizes the critical straits of international maritime commerce. They define the pace and capacity of modern life.
Despite their importance to life, the quotidian freedom of navigation largely enjoyed through these lanes is taken much for granted. Most general publics are rarely cognizant that the maintenance of the relative ease with which they are transited has been the enduring grand strategy of first the GB/UK and then the US since the 18th century. (No, my dear readers, grand strategy is no fickle, changeable creature, but the explanation of the nature of that thing is for another time.) Much of modern geopolitics involve these points on the globe, and depend upon the function of the American and allied maritime security structure. Guaranteed. This sub-series of Life at the Junction will examine their issues and crises in turn.
As if to prove its worth in advance, events have lined up to provide a most compelling example of their importance and power to change the course of history to close this piece. Let us consider the political situation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. With the fall of Bashir al-Assad from power in Syria, Putin has lost a critical strategic maritime position. Access to both the Mediterranean and beyond and as a pivot to activities across Africa, loss of Russia’s most reliable ally in the region (with Iran, it is not the same – shared hatred of the US is not a sufficient basis for a relationship) has real geostrategic consequences for the Kremlin.
Even the exfiltration from positions in Syria has taxed Russian capabilities. Negotiated assistance from Turkey to provide lift to and safe space to redeploy home gives substance to Russia’s growing weakness in its ability to manage global commitments, or even care for their own. Moreover, it underlines the geographic dilemma Moscow now faces. With the base at Tartus soon to be lost, maritime access is considerably reduced. The ongoing war in the Black Sea further limits their freedom of navigation. And their access to the exit from those waters depends upon Turkey.
Which presents the opening for Erdogan and his relevant allies to act decisively on the Ukrainian front. Russia can either be embargoed in part by sea, or it can exit Ukraine. Only Turkey can make this demand, but Turkey can only do so within its alliances, both military and economic. It is the sort of international political opportunity that rarely presents itself. But there it sits, the only singular move that could end Russia’s war. All that remains to be seen is whether the players recognize the reality and seize it.